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CURRENT DECISIONS
BANKRUPTCY-CONTRACTS-RESCISSION ON GROUNDS OF FRAUD AMOUNTING TO
A PREFERENE.-In December, 1919, one Ponzi began a systematic scheme of
fraudulent borrowing on his personal notes, promising the lenders a return of
Io% in forty-five days. He later publicly announced that he would return the
principal in full in less than that time, if the lenders became dissatisfied. His
scheme was to pay the first comers with the loans of later dupes. The defen-
dants loaned him various sums which he deposited in the X bank of Boston between
July 2o and 24, 192o. On July ig, Ponzi's deposits there aggregated $334,000.
On July 24, his balance was $871,ooo. By July 28, all these deposits had been
withdrawn but a large balance was still maintained by transferring all his deposits
in other banks to the X bank. On August 2, the fraud was exposed and in the
"run" on Ponzi's Boston office subsequent to the exposure, the defendants suc-
ceeded in procuring a return of their loans although they were not yet due. On
August io, Ponzi became a bankrupt. His trustee in bankruptcy sued in equity to
collect these payments as voidable preferences under the Bankruptcy Act. The
district court dismissed his bill and the dismissal was upheld by the circuit court of
appeals. Held, that the decree be reversed. Cunningham, Trustee, v. Brown
(Apr. 28, 1924) U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, 1923, No. 213.
The supreme court held that the repayment did not constitute a rescission by the
defendants on grounds of fraud. And that if it did, such repayment created a
preference, the original fund paid in by the defendants having been exhausted by
subsequent payments by Ponzi to his creditors. Thus the relation of cestui and
trustee could not exist between Ponzi and the defendants at the time of the repay-
ment. For a criticism of the lower court here reversed, see COMMENTS (1923) 32
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 267.
BANKS AND BANKING-GENERAL DEPOSIT FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE.-A depositor
of the defendant bank gave his check in its favor for transmission to the plaintiff
bank to the credit of a third person. The defendant wired the plaintiff to extend
the credit and promised to remit by draft on a New York bank. The plaintiff
paid the money before receiving the draft which the New York bank refused to
honor due to the insolvency of the defendant. The plaintiff filed a claim as a
preferred creditor. Held, that the plaintiff was a general creditor. First National
Bank of Shreveport v. State Bank of Portland (1924., Or.). 222 Pac. 1079.
The instant case soundly recognizes that the actual transaction is an executory
contract for the purchase of credit. Noyes v. First Nat. Bank (1917) 18o App.
Div. 162. 167 N. Y. Supp. 288; Schofield v. Cochran (19o4) i19 Ga. 9oi, 47 S. E.
208; see (1923) 32 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 410; COMMEfTS (1924) 33 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 177. Many courts confuse this with a general deposit for a specific
purpose and invoke a trust Morton v. Woolery (1922, N. D.) 18p N. W. 232;
Titlow v. Sundquist (1916, C. C. A. 9th) 234 Fed. 613; State v. Grills (1912)
35 R. I. 70, 85 AtI. 281.
EQUITY-LITERARY PROPERTY-INJUNCTION AGAINST PUBLICATION NOT GRANTED
TO RECIPIENT OF LETTER.-The defendants had acquired possession of letters
received by the plaintiffs and were publishing them. The plaintiffs sought to
enjoin publication. Held, that the injunction be refused. Knights of Ku Klux
Klan v. International Magazine Co. (1923, C. C. A. 2d) 294 Fed. 661.
The recipient owns only the physical substance of a letter, while property in the
expressed thought remains in the author. Baker v. Libbie (1912) 21o Mass. 599,
97 N. E. IO9; Philip v. Pennell [1907] 2 Ch. 577. A recipient has been allowed
to enjoin publication without joining the author as co-plaintiff. Granard v. Dunkin




the idea in which the recipient has no property interest, the instant case reaches
the sounder result.
EVIDENcE-HEARSAY-SPONTANEOUS DECLARATION.-In an action for the death
of a pedestrian struck by a truck, the plaintiff offered in evidence the statement
made by the driver immediately after stopping the truck over Ioo feet from the
point of collision, "Arrest me officer, it is my fault." The defendant objected to
the evidence as hearsay. The lower court sustained the objection. Held, that the
judgment be affirmed. Perry v. Harritos (1924, Conn.) 124 Atl. 45.
The court overruled Morse v. Consolidated Ry. Co. (19o8) 81 Conn. 395, 71 Atd.
553, which held that an utterance caused by a startling event is admissible only if
made contemporaneous with the event. The instant case adopts the better view
that the test is whether the utterance was spontaneous and unreflective. Lapse
of time between event and utterance is only evidence of lack of spontaneity. The
spontaneity of the utterance is a sufficient guarantee of trustworthiness. Roach v.
Gt. Northern Ry. Co. (1916) 133 Minn. 257, I58 N. W. 232; Eby v. Travelers
Is. Co. (1917) 258 Pa. 525, 1o2 Atl. 209; Starcher v. South Pennsylvania Coal
Co. (1918) 81 W. Va. 587, 95 S. E. 28; Washington Ry. Co. v. Deahi (1919)
126 Va. 141, ioo S. E. 840; 3 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 1747;
Morgan, Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 238.
INSURANcE-ExEcUTION OF INSURED FOR MURDER A DEFENSE.-An insured
murdered the beneficiary and was executed for the crime. The policy did not
expressly exempt the company from liability for death by legal execution. The
insured's executrix sued under a provision "that, if the beneficiary should prede-
cease the insured, the interest in the policy would vest in the insured." Held, that
she could not recover. Smith v. Metropolitan Ins. Co. (1923, Mun. Ct.) 122 Misc.
136, 203 N. Y. Supp. 173.
The court, with a vague reference to public policy, accepts the view that death
by legal execution is impliedly excepted from the risks assumed. Collins v.
Metropolitan Ins. Co. (19o7) 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 353; Northwestern Ins. Co. v.
McCue (1912) 223 U. S. 234, 32 Sup. Ct. 22o. However, an incontestable clause
has been held to invalidate this defense. Weil v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (I9I8) 201
Ala. 409, 78 So. 528; contra: Scarborough v. American National Ins. Co. (1916)
171 N. C. 353, 88 S. E. 482. And, in some states, it is said to add forfeiture of
property to punishment for crime, which is inconsistent with constitutional or
statutory provisions abolishing such forfeitures. Collins v. Metropolitan Ins. Co.
(1907) 232 Ill. 37, 83 N. E. 542; Fields v. Metropolitan Ins. Co. (1923, Tenn.)
249 S. W. 798; Am. Nat. Ins. Co. v. Coates (1923) 112 Tex. 267, 246 S. W. 356.
The latter aspect was apparently ignored by the court. See N. Y. Cons. Laws,
19o9, ch. 88, sec. 512. The tendency is to deny an implied exemption from liability
in the analogous cases of suicide. See COMMENTS (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
401.
JUDGMENTS-REs ADjUDICATA-CONcLUSIVENESS OF FINDING OF FACT IN PRIOR
BANKRUPTCY PROCEE)ING.-In an action for deceit the plaintiff alleged that the
defendants had obtained credit from him by a false statement as to their financial
condition. In a prior bankruptcy proceeding against the defendants, the plaintiff
had opposed the confirmation of an offer of composition on the same ground, but
the court found that the statement was true when made, and the composition was
confirmed. The lower court excluded this evidence and the defendant appealed.
Held, that the determination of this fact in the bankruptcy proceeding was con-
clusive in the instant case. Myers v. International Truat Co. (1923) 263 U. S.
64, 44 Sup. Ct. 86.
The adjudication of an operative fact essential to the determination of a case
in a prior proceeding, is conclusive if the same fact is again at issue between the
32
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parties. Union Central Life Im. Co. v. Drake (1914, C. C. A. 8th) 214 Fed. 536;
Sutton v. Wentworth (1917, C. C. A. ist) 247 Fed. 493; (1915) 14 MICH. L.
REV. 241. It is not necessary that the adjudication be made in the prosecution of
the same claim or demand. Hickman v. Town of Fletcher (jqi2, C. C. A. 8th)
195 Fed. 9o7.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE-REcRIMINATIoN-ADULTERY OF PETITIONER No BAR--
In an action for divorce, the evidence showed that both the petitioner and her
husband had been guilty of adultery, the petitioner with one C; that C was willing
to marry her, and that she had left her husband's home because of his cruelty.
Under the Matrimonial Cause Act (1857) 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, sec. 31, the court
has discretionary power to grant a divorce where both parties are guilty of
misconduct. Held, that the divorce be granted. Tickner v. Tickner (924, P.)
4o T. L. R. 367.
It is generally held in this country that if the petitioner's misconduct is itself
sufficient ground for divorce, a decree will not be granted. Day v. Day (1905) 71
Kan. 385, 8o Pac. 974; Keezer, Marriage and Divorce (2d ed. 1923) sec. 427. A
decree, however, may be granted where both parties are not equally at fault.
Johnsen v. Johnsen (1914) 78 Wash. 423, 139 Pac. 189. Or where the misconduct
of one is provoked by the other. Garrett v. Garrett (191I) 252 Ill. 318, 96 N. E.
882. A discretionary power in the court, as in the instant case, seems the best
solution of a difficult problem. A relaxation of the general rule under extraordi-
nary circumstances is beneficial. See Weiss v. Weiss (1913) 174 Mich. 431, 140
N. W. 587; (1924) 2 AMERICAN MERCURY, 39.
REPLEVIN-STATUTORY FORTHCOMING BOND--AccIDENTAL DESTRUCTION OF
PROPERTY.-A sheriff, acting under N. C. Cons. Sts. sec. 3403, seized an automobile
used in violation of the prohibition law, and when directed in replevin to deliver
it to the plaintiff, who claimed it as a mortgagee, gave a forthcoming bond retain-
ing possession of the property. Thereafter the property was destroyed without
the defendant's fault. From a judgment for the plaintiff the defendant appealed.
Held, (two judges dissenting) that the judgment be affirmed. T. & H. Motor Co.
v. Sands (1923) 186 N. C. 732, 120 S. E. 459.
At common law, one who obtains possession of goods by a writ of replevin is,
in case of subsequent accidental destruction, responsible for their value on his
forthcoming bond, if his claim to the goods proves unfounded. Lillie v. McMillan
(1879) 52 Iowa, 463, 3 N. W. 6oi; Suppiger v. Gruaz (1891) 137 Ill. 216, 27
N. E. 22. Similarly, by express provision of statutes permitting the defendant
to retain the chattel on giving bond. Bradley v. Campbell (19o8) 132 Mo. App.
78, III S. W. 514; Randolph v. McGowans (1917) 174 N. C. 2o3, 93 S. E. 73o;
contra: Jennings v. Sparkman (1892) 48 Mo. App. 246. The confiscation statute
in the instant case has been held not to prejudice the rights of innocent third
parties. Skinner v. Thomas (1916) 171 N. C. 98, 87 S. E. 976. It seems that the
sheriff would then be justified in permitting one claiming to be such a party to take
possession under a writ of replevin, as the forthcoming bond would give the state
full protection.
SALES-OPEN BILL OF LADING-LIABILITY OF . CARRIER FOR EDELIVERY TO THE
SHIPPER NOT NAMED AS CONSIGNoR.-A, having contracted to sell a carload of
lumber to the plaintiff, but not having the lumber on hand, contracted to purchase
the lumber from B to be sent to the plaintiff. B delivered the lumber to the
defendant carrier on an open bill of lading, naming A as consignor and the
plaintiff as consignee, and attached a draft to the bill of lading and sent them to
A. On A's refusal to pay the draft, B demanded and received a redelivery of the
lumber from the defendant. The plaintiff had paid a draft attached to a bill of
lading which was sent to him by A. There was evidence that by prior dealings
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between B and A, B reserved title. Held, that the plaintiff cannot recover.
Collins v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. (I924, N. C.) 120 S. E. 824.
By the unusual term "open bill of lading" seems to be meant a straight bill.
Saunder Bros. v. Payne (1923, Ga.) 116 S. E. 349. Delivery to a carrier of goods
on such a bill prima facie passes title to the consignee who alone can sue the
carrier, and whose instructions in respect to the goods the carrier may follow.
Ellington v. Norfolk & So. Ry. (915) 17o N. C. 36, 86 S. E. 693; Georgia
Marble Works v. Minor (1917) 128 Ark. 124, 193 S. W. 498. But where the
carrier's default resulted in non-acceptance, the consignor was allowed to sue the
carrier. Savannah, F. & W. Ry. v. Commercial Guano Co. (1898) 1o3 Ga. 59o,
30 S. E. 555; Anderson v. American Ry. Express Co. (1924, N. C.) 12r S. E. 354.
But the general rule is that shipment by a seller to his buyer's sub-vendee bars
stoppage in transit. Memphis R. R. v. Freed (1882) 38 Ark. 614; Williston,
Sales (igog) sec. 525. And regardless of the prior dealings between A and B in
the instant case, it seems that in the absence of notice, payment by the plaintiff,
on the faith of accurate evidence of shipment direct to him, should have settled his
right to the goods.
TORTS-FALsE IMPRISONMENT-COMMITTING SANE PERSON TO INSANE Hospi-
TAL.-The plaintiff was released from an insane hospital on probation for a
period of 3o days. During such period, without honest belief in his insanity, the
defendant, Commissioner of Lunacy, detained him and notified the manager of
the hospital. The latter in good faith recommitted the plaintiff without examina-
tion. After being confined for nine years, he sued for false imprisonment. From
a verdict for £25,ooo for the whole period of detention, to be apportioned at the
rate of seven-tenths against the commissioner and three-tenths against the manager
of the hospital, the defendants appealed. Held, that the plaintiff should recover
£5,ooo for the original detention by the Commissioner and the remaining o20,ooo
should be awarded according to the jury's apportionment. Harnett v. Bond
(1924, K. B.) 4o T. L. P- 414.
A physician who in good faith, but without reasonable care, causes a sane
person to be confined in an insane hospital, is liable for false imprisonment.
Ayers v. Russell (i888M, N. Y.) 5o Hun. 282 3 N. Y. Supp. 338; Hall v. Semple
(1862, Q. B.) 3 Fost. & F. 337. As in the instant case the damages will be
enhanced upon proof of an improper motive. Bacon v. Bacon (1898) 76 Miss. 458,
24 So. 968. If the mistake is due to a mere error in judgment there is no liability.
Williams v. LeBar (18qi) 141 Pa. 149, 21 Atl. 525; Everett v. Griffiths (1920,
C. A.) 3 K. B. 163.
WILLs-INTERPRErATION-RIGHT OF LmFE TENANT TO SHARE IN A LimrrAxiox
ovE To TESTATOR'S "Hxms AT LAw."-A trust was created by will for life, and
thereafter contingently to the testator's "heirs at law." At the testator's death,
the life tenant was his sole heir at law. Held, that upon the happening of the
contingency the remainder passed to the testator's heirs at law excluding the life
tenant. Gross v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. (1924, Conn.) 123 Atl. 9o7.
An heir is not precluded from taking a limitation over merely because he takes
as life tenant. Redmond v. G nmere (1922, N. J.) 119 At. 631; (1923) 33 YALE
LAW JoURNAL, 217; see (1919) 29 ibid. 575; see (1923) 21 MIcH. L. REv. 612.
This fact may, however, be considered in determining whether the testator intended
to exclude the life tenant from participating in the gift over. Wadsworth v.
Murray (19oo) I6I N. Y. 274, 55 N. E. 9io; see 13 A. L. R. 615, note. The
Connecticut courts seem to have gone further and presume an intent to exclude
unless a contrary intent is manifest from the language of the will. Close v.
Benham (1921) 97 Conn. io2, 115 Atl. 626; see (1921) 35 HAzv. L. Rxv. 89o.
